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August 1996
Prepayment Pitfalls
Roger Bernhardt4
Biancalana v Fleming (1996) 45 CA4th 698, 53 CR2d 47 (reported at 19 CEB RPLR 164
(July 1996)) provides an example of useful forethought by real property sellers in selling their
property for credit rather than immediate cash. They rejected a cash offer of $1.2 million in favor
of one for only $950,000, but payable over 20 years, which allowed them to defer most of their
tax liability on the sale. In order to ensure that the tax-deferred installment sale arrangement held
up, however, they wisely inserted a clause in the note that penalized the buyer for any
“additional” income tax the sellers might incur if the buyer prepaid more than 15 percent of the
note in any one year.
After the Biancalana buyer defaulted, the sellers began foreclosure proceedings. The buyer
then tendered the full loan amount due, minus the prepayment penalty demanded by the sellers.
When the sellers rejected the tender, the buyer sued for a declaration that the prepayment clause
was unenforceable. The provision was upheld against the buyer’s arguments that:
1. Accelerated tax was not additional tax (the sellers’ taxable gain was fixed at the time of
sale and a prepayment would not cause additional tax, though as a result the sellers might pay tax
sooner rather than later);
2. The 15-percent grace amount each year could be accumulated (i.e., because the loan could
have been paid in full without penalty after seven years (15 percent per year), it could be paid
without penalty after nine years as the buyer had tried to do); and
3. Acceleration based on the buyer’s default was not covered by the clause.
In those respects, therefore, the language of the provision (quoted in the opinion) should be
saved and copied into form files.
However, the clause could use a lot of revision. Prepayment penalty clauses (or prepayment
privilege clauses, depending on your point of view), are usually complicated and negotiated
affairs in commercial lending arrangements, but when amateur sellers take back paper in
connection with the sale of their residences, prepayment rights usually depend on the accidental
wording of the form supplied by a title company rather than on any considered or negotiated
arrangement.
The rules regarding prepayments are generally counterintuitive. Laypersons believe that
paying a debt early is a good thing, and only lawyers treat it as a breach of the promise to pay on
time (the perfect-tender-in-time rule). Likewise, few besides lawyers appreciate that permission
to prepay can be surreptitiously tucked into a note by simply adding “or more” or “on or before”
in the right place. On their own, most buyers and sellers probably have entirely incorrect notions
about whether their notes can be paid off early and for what cost.
“Most buyers and sellers probably have entirely incorrect notions about whether their notes
can be paid off early and for what cost.”
Because prepayment is so common, attorneys should be advising their clients about this
matter, but like too many other aspects of real estate transactions, what should be simple can
become enormously complicated. There are many options to consider, and not a great deal of
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certainty about the effectiveness of many of the choices. It is easier to draft clauses than to
guarantee that they will work.
The first choice is to decide how much prepayment should cost. Some measures are more or
less safe harbors (see, e.g., CC §2954.9, which permits six months’ interest prepayment penalty
for certain residential loans); however, the enforceability of other more creative calculations,
such as “yield maintenance” formulas (see 1 California Real Property Financing §3.35 (Cal CEB
1988)), is unpredictable, especially in bankruptcy. The commonly invoked standard of
unconscionability offers, of course, no guidance at all. Dale Whitman (of Nelson and Whitman
Hornbook fame) argues persuasively that prepayment clauses ought to be analyzed and tested as
liquidated damage provisions, but he acknowledges that the courts seem not to have caught on to
that idea. Whitman, Mortgage Prepayment Clauses: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 40 UCLA
L Rev 851 (1993). (I must confess that most of the ideas in this column can be found, better
stated and far more richly elaborated, in his article.)
Then there is the question of a “lock-in,” which bars prepayment absolutely during the early
years of the loan. Are lock-in clauses really enforceable as written, i.e., is the promise not to
prepay so unique or the harm from breach so irreparable that it should be specifically enforced
(especially if the borrowers are willing to post a letter of credit or something similar as substitute
security)? Can we be sure that a court won’t let the buyers breach and pay damages instead if
that is more efficient?
Other choices concern the kind of events that will trigger the charge. The Biancalana
prepayment clause did not expressly refer to involuntary accelerations (e.g., a seller’s
acceleration based on the buyer’s default) and the sellers lucked out only because of some
fortuitous language in their acceleration clause. They would have been on much firmer ground
had their prepayment clause said “whether voluntary or involuntary.” As far as enforceability is
concerned, Biancalana did uphold the sellers’ rejection of the buyer’s attempt to cure by
tendering the entire balance minus the penalty, thereby validating the clause in a foreclosure
setting. (I guess that also means that, had they gone to sale, the sellers could have credit bid the
prepayment penalty as well as the unpaid balance—if their accountant advised them to do so.)
“Prepayments resulting from insurance or eminent domain award money may or may not
trigger a charge, depending on the explicitness of language and the attitude of the judges.”
If the charge is imposed without limitation, then prepayments resulting from insurance or
eminent domain award money (assuming that the sellers are otherwise entitled to some part of
these funds) may or may not trigger a charge, depending on the explicitness of language and the
attitude of the judges, who may find something unseemly either in saying “I want to have the
insurance money paid to me rather than used to repair the security, and I also want a prepayment
charge for taking the money I just demanded,” or in accelerating under a due-on-sale clause and
then charging the buyers for the privilege of prepaying their accelerated loan. See Garvey v
Brace (Ct App, July 25, 1996, B092376) 96 Daily Journal DAR 8989, 96 Recorder CDOS 5527,
for an illustration of how courts may strain to avoid enforcement that is too costly to the buyer.
Apart from all that, all you have to worry about is whether the clause you drafted constitutes
usury, a restraint on alienation, or a clog on the equity of redemption. And if it survives all of
those attacks, you can be sure that the borrowers will think of new ones to add—a debtor
determined to pay may be unstoppable!

